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Abstract
Adapting Dretske’s approach on the necessary conditions for
mental process, we apply a communication theory analysis
of interacting cognitive biological and social modules to the
global neuronal workspace, the emerging standard model for
consciousness. Using an obvious canonical homology with sta-
tistical physics, the method, when iterated, generates a fluctu-
ating dynamic threshold recognizably similar to phase transi-
tion in a physical system, but constrained to a manifold/atlas
structure analogous to a tunable retina. The resulting ‘Gen-
eral Cognitive Model’ can be extended in a straightforward
manner to include the effects of psychosocial stress, culture,
or other cognitive modules which constitute a structured,
embedding, hierarchy of contextual constraints acting at a
slower rate than neuronal function itself. This produces an
empirically-testable ‘biopsychosociocultural’ treatment of in-
dividual consciousness that, while otherwise remarkably simi-
lar to the standard development, meets compelling philosoph-
ical and other objections to brain-only descriptions.
Key words: asymptotic limit theorems, atlas, cognition,
consciousness, Dretske, groupoid, information theory, mani-
fold, Onsager relations, orbit equivalence relation, phase tran-
sition, punctuated equilibrium, renormalization.
1 Introduction
A recent special issue of Cognition (79(1-2), 2001)) explores
contemporary work on consciousness in humans, presenting
various aspects of the new ‘standard model’ synthesized over
the last decade or so (esp. Dehaene and Naccache, 2001).
Sergeant and Dehaene (2004) describe that work, and some
of the implicit controversy, as follows:
“[A growing body of empirical study shows] large
all-or-none changes in neural activity when a stimu-
lus fails to be [consciously] reported as compared to
when it is reported... [A] qualitative difference be-
tween unconscious and conscious processing is gen-
erally expected by theories that view recurrent in-
teractions between distant brain areas as a nec-
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essary condition for conscious perception... One
of these theories has proposed that consciousness
is associated with the interconnection of multiple
areas processing a stimulus by a [dynamic] ‘neu-
ronal workspace’ within which recurrent connec-
tions allow long-distance communication and auto-
amplification of the activation. Neuronal network
simulations... suggest the existence of a fluctuating
dynamic threshold. If the primary activation evoked
by a stimulus exceeds this threshold, reverberation
takes place and stimulus information gains access,
through the workspace, to a broad range of [other
brain] areas allowing, among other processes, ver-
bal report, voluntary manipulation, voluntary action
and long-term memorization. Below this thresh-
old, however, stimulus information remains unavail-
able to these processes. Thus the global neuronal
workspace theory predicts an all-or-nothing tran-
sition between conscious and unconscious percep-
tion... More generally, many non-linear dynamical
systems with self-amplification are characterized by
the presence of discontinuous transitions in internal
state...”
The review by Baars (2002) provides a somewhat different
perspective on recent rapid progress in this direction, exam-
ining his own pioneering studies (Baars, 1983, 1988), along
with the work of Edleman (1989), Damasio (1989), Freeman
(1991), Llinas et al. (1998), Edelman and Tononi (2000), and
so on.
Baars and Franklin (2003) describe the overall model as
follows:
(1) The brain can be viewed as a collection of distributed
specialized networks (processors).
(2) Consciousness is associated with a global workspace in
the brain – a fleeting memory capacity whose focal contents
are widely distributed (‘broadcast’) to many unconscious spe-
cialized networks.
(3) Conversely, a global workspace can also serve to inte-
grate many competing and cooperating input networks.
(4) Some unconscious networks, called contexts, shape con-
scious contents, for example unconscious parietal maps mod-
ulate visual feature cells that underlie the perception of color
in the ventral stream.
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(5) Such contexts work together jointly to constrain con-
scious events.
(6) Motives and emotions can be viewed as goal contexts.
(7) Executive functions work as hierarchies of goal contexts.
Our particular extension of this perspective will be to in-
troduce the idea of a hierarchical structure for ‘contexts-of-
context’. We attempt to explicitly model the roles of cul-
ture, individual developmental and community history, and
embedding sociocultural network in creating a further – and
very powerful – hierarchy of constraints to conscious events.
To do this we must bring together two other related strains
of research on neural function, cognition, and consciousness,
taken, respectively, from physics and philosophy.
The increasingly dominant global neuronal workspace
paradigm has a corresponding track within the physics litera-
ture, involving adaptation of a highly mathematical statistical
mechanics formalism to explore observed phase transition-like
behavior in the brain. These efforts range from ‘bottom up’
treatments by Ingber (1982, 1992) based on interacting neural
network models, to the recent ‘top down’ mean-field approach
of Steyn-Ross et al. (2001, 2003) which seeks to explain em-
pirically observed all-or-nothing effects in general anesthesia.
Parallel to both the neuroscience and physics lines of re-
search, but absent invocation of either dynamic systems the-
ory or statistical mechanics, is what Adams (2003) has char-
acterized as ‘the informational turn in philosophy’, that is,
the application of communication theory formalism and con-
cepts to “purposive behavior, learning, pattern recognition,
and... the naturalization of mind and meaning”. One of the
first comprehensive attempts was that of Dretske (1981, 1988,
1992, 1993, 1994), whose work Adams describes as follows:
“It is not uncommon to think that information
is a commodity generated by things with minds.
Let’s say that a naturalized account puts matters
the other way around, viz. it says that minds are
things that come into being by purely natural causal
means of exploiting the information in their environ-
ments. This is the approach of Dretske as he tried
consciously to unite the cognitive sciences around
the well-understood mathematical theory of commu-
nication...”
Dretske himself (1994) writes:
“Communication theory can be interpreted as
telling one something important about the condi-
tions that are needed for the transmission of infor-
mation as ordinarily understood, about what it takes
for the transmission of semantic information. This
has tempted people... to exploit [information the-
ory] in semantic and cognitive studies, and thus in
the philosophy of mind.
...Unless there is a statistically reliable channel of
communication between [a source and a receiver]...
no signal can carry semantic information... [thus]
the channel over which the [semantic] signal arrives
[must satisfy] the appropriate statistical constraints
of communication theory.”
Here we redirect attention from the informational content
or meaning of individual symbols, i.e. the province of seman-
tics which so concerned Dretske, back to the statistical prop-
erties of long, internally-structured paths of symbols emitted
by an information source which is ‘dual’ to a cognitive process
in a particular sense. We will then adapt and modify a va-
riety of tools from statistical physics to produce dynamically
tunable punctuated or phase transition coupling between in-
teracting cognitive modules in what we claim is a highly nat-
ural manner. As Dretske so clearly saw, this approach allows
scientific inference on the necessary conditions for cognition,
and, we will show, greatly illuminates the global neuronal
workspace model of consciousness. It does so without raising
the 18th Century ghosts of noisy, distorted mechanical clocks
inherent to dynamic systems theory, and permits extension
far beyond what is possible using statistical mechanics mod-
els of neural networks. In essence the method broadly reca-
pitulates the General Linear Model for independent or simple
serially correlated observations, but on the punctuated out-
put of an information source, using the Shannon-McMillan
Theorem rather than the Central Limit Theorem. Punctua-
tion becomes the phenomenon of central interest, rather than
linear (or time series) parameter estimation.
The technique opens the way for the global neuronal
workspace to incorporate the effects of other cognitive mod-
ules, for example the immune system, and embedding, highly
structured, social or cultural contexts that may, although act-
ing at slower timescales, greatly affect individual conscious-
ness. These contexts-of-context function in realms beyond the
brain-limited concept defined by Baars and Franklin (2003).
Such extension meets profound objections to brain-only mod-
els, for example the accusation of the ‘mereological fallacy’ by
Bennett and Hacker (2003), which we will consider in more
detail below.
Before entering the formal thicket, it is important to high-
light several points.
First, information theory is notorious for providing exis-
tence theorems whose representation, to use physics jargon,
is arduous. For example, although the Shannon Coding The-
orem implied the possibility of highly efficient coding schemes
as early as 1949, it took more than forty years for practical
‘turbo codes’ to actually be constructed. The research pro-
gram we implicitly propose here is unlikely to be any less
difficult.
Second, we are invoking information theory variants of the
fundamental limit theorems of probability. These are inde-
pendent of exact mechanisms, but constrain the behavior of
those mechanisms. For example, although not all processes
involve long sums of independent stochastic variables, those
that do, regardless of the individual variable distribution, col-
lectively follow a Normal distribution as a consequence of the
Central Limit Theorem. This has fundamental importance
for estimating functional models describing relations between
independent or simple serially correlated data sets – the Gen-
eral Linear Model and its stationary time series variants. Sim-
ilarly, the games of chance in a Las Vegas casino are all quite
different, but nonetheless the possible success of strategies
for playing them is strongly and systematically constrained
by the Martingale Theorem, regardless of game details. We
likewise propose that languages-on-networks and languages-
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that-interact, as a consequence of the limit theorems of in-
formation theory, will inherently be subject to regularities of
tunable punctuation and generalized Onsager relations, re-
gardless of detailed mechanisms, as important as the latter
may be.
Just as parametric statistics are imposed, at least as a first
approximation, on sometimes questionable experimental sit-
uations, relying on the robustness of the Central Limit The-
orem to carry us through, we will pursue a similar heuristic
approach here.
Finally, we invoke an obvious homology between informa-
tion source uncertainty and thermodynamic free energy den-
sity as justification for importing renormalization and gener-
alized Onsager relation formalism to the study of cognitive
process near and away from ‘critical points’ in the coupling
of cognitive submodules. The purpose is to create a ‘Gen-
eral Cognitive Model’ (GCM) for the punctuated behavior of
cognitive phenomena constrained by the Shannon-McMillan
Theorem, a model which permits estimation of essential sys-
tem parameters from observational data.
The question of whether we are demonstrating the neces-
sity of global phase transitions for information-transmission
networks or merely building a suggestive analogy with ther-
modynamics is, of course, ultimately an empirical one. For
the microscopic case, however, Feynman (1996) has shown
that the homology is an identity, which is no small matter
and indeed suggests that behavior analogous to phase tran-
sitions in simple physical systems should be ubiquitous for a
very broad class of information systems.
Our work appears similar, in a certain sense, to Bohr’s
treatment of the atom, which attempted a simple substitu-
tion of quantized angular momentum into a basically classi-
cal theory. Although incomplete, that analysis contributed
materially to the more comprehensive approaches of quan-
tum mechanics, relativistic quantum mechanics, and quantum
electrodynamics. In that spirit we hope that increasingly sat-
isfactory models will follow from the interplay of our work
here and appropriate empirical studies.
We begin with a description of cognitive process in terms
of an information source, a kind of language constrained by
the Shannon-McMillan or Asymptotic Equipartition Theo-
rem, and its Rate Distortion or Joint Asymptotic Equipar-
tition and other variants for interacting sources.
2 Cognition as language
2.1 Theory
Atlan and Cohen (1998) and Cohen (2000), following a long
tradition in the study of immune cognition (e.g., Grossman,
1989; Tauber, 1998), argue that the essence of cognitive func-
tion involves comparison of a perceived signal with an inter-
nal, learned picture of the world, and then, upon that compar-
ison, the choice of a response from a much larger repertoire of
possible responses. Following the approach of Wallace (2000,
2002a), we make a ‘weak’, and hence very general, model of
that process which we illustrate with two neural network ex-
amples.
Cognitive pattern recognition-and-response, as we charac-
terize it, proceeds by convoluting an incoming external sen-
sory incoming signal with an internal ongoing activity – the
learned picture of the world – and triggering an appropriate
action based on a decision that the pattern of sensory activ-
ity requires a response. We will, fulfilling Atlan and Cohen’s
(1998) criterion of meaning-from-response, define a language’s
contextual meaning entirely in terms of system output, leav-
ing out, for the moment, the question of how such a pattern
recognition system is trained, a matter for Rate Distortion
theory.
A pattern of sensory input is, then, mixed in an unspeci-
fied but systematic manner with an internal ‘ongoing’ activity
to create a path of convoluted signals x = (a0, a1, ..., an, ...).
Each ak thus represents some algorithmic or functional com-
position of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ signals.
This path is fed into a highly nonlinear, but otherwise sim-
ilarly unspecified, decision oscillator which generates an out-
put h(x) that is an element of one of two (presumably) disjoint
sets B0 and B1 of possible system responses. We take
B0 ≡ b0, ..., bk,
B1 ≡ bk+1, ..., bm.
Thus we permit a graded response, supposing that if
h(x) ∈ B0
the pattern is not recognized, and if
h(x) ∈ B1
the pattern is recognized and some action bj , k+1 ≤ j ≤ m
takes place.
We are interested in paths x which trigger pattern
recognition-and-response exactly once. That is, given a fixed
initial state a0, such that h(a0) ∈ B0, we examine all possi-
ble subsequent paths x beginning with a0 and leading exactly
once to the event h(x) ∈ B1. Thus h(a0, ..., aj) ∈ B0 for all
j < m, but h(a0, ..., am) ∈ B1.
For each positive integer n let N(n) be the number of high
probability ‘grammatical’ and ‘syntactical’ paths of length n
which begin with some particular a0 having h(a0) ∈ B0 and
lead to the condition h(x) ∈ B1. We shall call such paths
‘meaningful’ and assume N(n) to be considerably less than
the number of all possible paths of length n leading from a0
to the condition h(x) ∈ B1 – actual pattern recognition-and-
response is comparatively rare.
While convolution algorithm, the form of the nonlinear os-
cillator, and the details of grammar and syntax, may all be
unspecified in this model, the critical assumption which per-
mits inference on necessary conditions is that the finite limit
H ≡ lim
n→∞
log[N(n)]
n
both exists and is independent of the path x.
We will – not surprisingly – call such a pattern recognition-
and-response cognitive process ergodic. Not all such processes
are likely to be ergodic, implying that H, if it indeed exists, is
path dependent, although extension to ‘nearly’ ergodic pro-
cesses is straightforward.
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Invoking Shannon, we may thus define an ergodic in-
formation source X associated with stochastic variates Xj
having joint and conditional probabilities P (a0, ..., an) and
P (an|a0, ..., an−1) such that appropriate joint and conditional
Shannon uncertainties may be defined which satisfy the rela-
tions
H[X] = lim
n→∞
log[N(n)]
n
=
lim
n→∞H(Xn|X0, ..., Xn−1) =
lim
n→∞
H(X0, ..., Xn)
n
.
(1)
The Shannon uncertainties H(...) are defined in terms of
cross-sectional sums of the form −∑k Pk log[Pk], where the
Pk constitute a probability distribution. See Ash (1990) or
Cover and Thomas (1991) for details.
We say this information source is dual to the ergodic cog-
nitive process.
In essence we have created a statistical model of conscious-
ness which, in a somewhat counterintuitive fashion, is similar
in spirit to the General Linear Model (GLM) so familiar to
researchers, but is based on the Shannon McMillan, rather
than on the Central Limit, Theorem. As with the GLM, not
all phenomena of interest are going to fit. We will return to
these considerations below.
Again, for non-ergodic sources, a limit limn→∞H may be
defined for each path, but it will not necessarily given by
the simple cross-sectional law-of-large numbers analogs above.
For ‘nearly’ ergodic systems one might perhaps use something
of the form
H(x+ δx) ≈ H(x) + δxdH/dx.
Different language-analogs will, of course, be defined by
different divisions of the total universe of possible responses
into different pairs of sets B0 and B1, or by requiring more
than one response in B1 along a path. However, like the use of
different distortion measures in the Rate Distortion Theorem
(e.g. Cover and Thomas, 1991), it seems obvious that the
underlying dynamics will all be qualitatively similar.
Similar but not identical, and herein lies the first of two
essential matters: dividing the full set of possible responses
into sets B0 and B1 may itself require higher order cognitive
decisions by another module or modules, suggesting the ne-
cessity of ‘choice’ within a more or less broad set of possible
languages-of-thought. This would, in one way, reflect the need
of the organism to shift gears according to the different chal-
lenges it faces, leading to a model for autocognitive disease
when a normally excited state is recurrently (and incorrectly)
identified as a member of the ‘resting’ set B0 (e.g. Wallace,
2003).
A second possible source of structure, however, lies at the
input rather than the output end of the model: i.e. sup-
pose we classify paths instead of outputs. That is, we define
equivalence classes in convolutional ‘path space’ according to
whether a state ak can be connected by a path with some
originating state aM . We, in turn, set each possible state to
an a0, and define other states as formally equivalent to it if
they can be reached from that (now variable) a0 = aM by
some real path. A state which can be reached by a legiti-
mate grammatical and syntactical path from aM is taken as
equivalent to it.
We can thus divide path space into (ordinarily) disjoint
sets of equivalence classes. Each equivalence class defines its
own language-of-thought: disjoint cognitive modules, possi-
bly associated with an embedding equivalence class algebra
roughly analogous to the standard orbit equivalence construc-
tion for dynamical systems. Here, however, we are dealing
with the extraordinarily rich dynamics possible to general-
ized languages rather than the constrained behavior of the
usual distorted, noisy, clock-like contrivances of dynamical
systems theory. The image which comes to mind is compar-
ing the genome-environment interaction of evolutionary pro-
cess to the Newtonian dynamics of a planetary system.
The natural algebraic structure arising from this kind of de-
composition is the groupoid (Weinstein, 1996; Brown, 1987).
An open – and important – question is how path algebra
structures might relate to B-set structures.
While meaningful paths – creating an inherent grammar
and syntax – are defined entirely in terms of system response,
as Atlan and Cohen (1998) propose, a critical task is to make
these (relatively) disjoint cognitive modules interact, and to
examine the effects of that interaction on global properties.
One way this can be done is through measures of mutual
information and their appropriate asymptotic limit theorems.
Invoking an obvious homology with free energy density of a
physical system then gives punctuated phase transition in the
interaction between modules in what we claim to be a natural
manner.
Glazebrook (2004) has remarked that our construction can
be pieced together up to a global holonomy Lie groupoid using
the Aof-Brown globalization theorem (Aof and Brown, 1992),
a procedure which might shed further light on the problem of
interacting cognitive modules.
We will eventually parametize the information source un-
certainty of the dual information source with respect to one
or more variates, writing, e.g. H[K], where K ≡ (K1, ...,Ks)
represents a vector in a parameter space. Let the vector K
follow some path in time, i.e. trace out a generalized line
or surface K(t). We will, following the argument of Wal-
lace (2002b), assume that the probabilities defining H, for
the most part, closely track changes in K(t), so that along a
particular ‘piece’ of a path in parameter space the informa-
tion source remains as close to memoryless and ergodic as is
needed for the mathematics to work. Between pieces, below,
we will impose phase transition characterized by a renormal-
ization symmetry, in the sense of Wilson (1971).
We will call such an information source ‘adiabatically piece-
wise memoryless ergodic’ (APME).
To anticipate the argument, iterating the analysis on paths
of ‘tuned’ sets of renormalization parameters gives a second
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order punctuation in the rate at which primary interacting in-
formation sources representing cognitive submodules become
linked to each other: the shifting workspace structure of con-
sciousness.
2.2 Two examples
Before proceeding into the formal development we give two
applications of the general theory to neural networks.
First the simple Hopfield/Hebb stochastic neuron: A se-
ries of inputs yji , i = 1...m from m nearby neurons at time
j is convoluted with ‘weights’ wji , i = 1...m, using an inner
product
aj = yj ·wj =
m∑
i=1
yjiw
j
i
in the context of a ‘transfer function’ f(yj ·wj) such that the
probability of the neuron firing and having a discrete output
zj = 1 is P (zj = 1) = f(yj ·wj). Thus the probability that
the neuron does not fire at time j is 1− f(yj ·wj).
In the terminology of this section them values yji constitute
‘sensory activity’ and the m weights wji the ‘ongoing activity’
at time j, with aj = yj ·wj and x = a0, a1, ...an, ...
A little more work leads to a fairly standard neural network
model in which the network is trained by appropriately vary-
ing the w through least squares or other error minimization
feedback. This can be shown to, essentially, replicate rate
distortion arguments (Cover and Thomas, 1991), as we can
use the error definition to define a distortion function d(y, yˆ)
which measures the difference between the training pattern y
and the network output yˆ as a function of, for example, the
inverse number of training cycles, K. As discussed in some
detail elsewhere (Wallace, 2002), learning plateau behavior
follows as a phase transition on the parameter K in the mu-
tual information I(Y, Yˆ ).
Park et al. (2000) treat the stochastic neural network
in terms of a space of related probability density functions
[p(x,y;w)|w ∈ Rm], where x is the input, y the output and
w the parameter vector. The goal of learning is to find an op-
timum w∗ which maximizes the log likelihood function. They
define a loss function of learning as
L(x,y;w) ≡ − log p(x,y;w),
and one can take as a learning paradigm the gradient rela-
tion
wt+1 = wt − ηt∂L(x,y;w)/∂w,
where ηt is a learning rate.
Park et al. (2000) attack this optimization problem by
recognizing that the space of p(x,y;w) is Riemannian with a
metric given by the Fisher information matrix
G(w) =
∫ ∫
∂ log p/∂w[∂ log p/∂w]T p(x,y;w)dydx
where T is the transpose operation. A Fisher-efficient on-
line estimator is then obtained by using the ‘natural’ gradient
algorithm
wt+1 = wt − ηtG−1∂L(x,y;w)/∂w.
Again, through the synergistic family of probability distri-
butions p(x,y;w), this can be viewed as a special case – a
‘representation’, to use physics jargon – of the general ‘con-
volution argument’ given above.
It seems likely that a rate distortion analysis of the inter-
action between training language and network response lan-
guage will nonetheless show the ubiquity of learning plateaus,
even in this rather elegant special case.
Dimitrov and Miller (2001) provide a similar, and very el-
egant, information-theoretic approach to neural coding and
decoding, albeit without address of punctuation.
3 Interacting cognitive modules
We suppose that two (relatively) distinct cognitive submod-
ules can be represented by two distinct sequences of states,
the paths x ≡ x0, x1, ... and y ≡ y0, y1, .... These paths are,
however, both very highly structured and serially correlated
and have dual information sources X and Y. Since the mod-
ules, in reality, interact through some kind of endless back-
and-forth mutual crosstalk, these sequences of states are not
independent, but are jointly serially correlated. We can, then,
define a path of sequential pairs as z ≡ (x0, y0), (x1, y1), ....
The essential content of the Joint Asymptotic Equipartition
Theorem (JAEPT), a variant of the Shannon-McMillan The-
orem, is that the set of joint paths z can be partitioned into
a relatively small set of high probability termed jointly typ-
ical, and a much larger set of vanishingly small probability.
Further, according to the JAEPT, the splitting criterion be-
tween high and low probability sets of pairs is the mutual
information
I(X,Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y )
where H(X),H(Y ),H(X|Y ) and H(X,Y ) are, respec-
tively, the (cross-sectional) Shannon uncertainties of X and
Y , their conditional uncertainty, and their joint uncertainty.
See Cover and Thomas (1991) for mathematical details.
Again, similar approaches to neural process have been re-
cently adopted by Dimitrov and Miller (2001).
Note that, using this asymptotic limit theorem approach,
we need not model the exact form or dynamics of the crosstalk
feedback, hence crushing algebraic complexities can be post-
poned until a later stage of the argument. They will, however,
appear in due course with some vengeance.
The high probability pairs of paths are, in this formulation,
all equiprobable, and if N(n) is the number of jointly typical
pairs of length n, then
I(X,Y ) = lim
n→∞
log[N(n)]
n
.
Extending the earlier language-on-a-network models of
Wallace and Wallace (1998, 1999), we suppose there is a cou-
pling parameter P representing the degree of linkage between
the modules, and set K = 1/P , following the development
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of those earlier studies. Note that in a brain model this pa-
rameter represents the intensity of coupling between distant
neural structures.
Then we have
I[K] = lim
n→∞
log[N(K,n)]
n
.
The essential ‘homology’ between information theory and
statistical mechanics lies in the similarity of this expression
with the infinite volume limit of the free energy density. If
Z(K) is the statistical mechanics partition function derived
from the system’s Hamiltonian, then the free energy density
is determined by the relation
F [K] = lim
V→∞
log[Z(K)]
V
.
F is the free energy density, V the system volume and K =
1/T , where T is the system temperature.
We and others argue at some length (Wallace and Wallace,
1998, 1999; Rojdestvensky and Cottam, 2000) that this is
indeed a systematic mathematical homology which, we con-
tend, permits importation of renormalization symmetry into
information theory. Imposition of invariance under renormal-
ization on the mutual information splitting criterion I(X,Y )
implies the existence of phase transitions analogous to learn-
ing plateaus or punctuated evolutionary equilibria. An exten-
sive mathematical development will be presented in the next
section.
The physiological details of mechanism, we speculate, will
be particularly captured by the definitions of coupling param-
eter, renormalization symmetry, and, perhaps, the distribu-
tion of the renormalization across agency, a matter we treat
below.
Here, however, these changes are perhaps better described
as ‘punctuated interpenetration’ between interacting cogni-
tive modules.
We reiterate that the details are highly dependent on the
choice of renormalization symmetry and distribution, which
are likely to reflect details of mechanism – the manner in
which the dynamics of the forest are dependent on the detailed
physiology of trees, albeit in a many-to-one manner. Renor-
malization properties are not likely to follow simple physical
analogs, and may well be subject, in addition to complications
of distribution, to the ‘tuning’ of universality class parameters
that are characteristically fixed for simple physical systems.
The algebra is straightforward if complicated, and given later.
4 Representations of the general ar-
gument
4.1 Language-on-a-network models
Earlier papers of this series addressed the problem of how
a language, in a large sense, spoken on a network struc-
ture responds as properties of the network change. The lan-
guage might be speech, pattern recognition, or cognition. The
network might be social, chemical, or neural. The proper-
ties of interest were the magnitude of ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ ties
which, respectively, either disjointly partitioned the network
or linked it across such partitioning. These would be analo-
gous to local and mean-field couplings in physical systems.
We fix the magnitude of strong ties – to reiterate, those
which disjointly partition the underlying network (presum-
ably into cognitive submodules) – but vary the index of weak
ties between components, which we call P , taking K = 1/P .
For interacting neural networks P might simply be taken as
proportional to the degree of crosstalk.
We assume the piecewise, adiabatically memoryless ergodic
information source (Wallace, 2002b) depends on three param-
eters, two explicit and one implicit. The explicit are K as
above and an ‘external field strength’ analog J , which gives a
‘direction’ to the system. We will, in the limit, set J = 0.
The implicit parameter, which we call r, is an inherent gen-
eralized ‘length’ characteristic of the phenomenon, on which
J and K are defined. That is, we can write J and K as
functions of averages of the parameter r, which may be quite
complex, having nothing at all to do with conventional ideas
of space: For example r may be defined by the degree of niche
partitioning in ecosystems or separation in social structures.
For a given generalized language of interest with a well
defined (adiabatically, piecewise memoryless,) ergodic source
uncertainty H we write
H[K,J,X]
To summarize a long train of standard argument (e.g. Bin-
ney et al., 1986; Wilson, 1971), imposition of invariance of H
under a renormalization transform in the implicit parameter
r leads to expectation of both a critical point in K, which
we call KC , reflecting a phase transition to or from collec-
tive behavior across the entire array, and of power laws for
system behavior near KC . Addition of other parameters to
the system, e.g. some V , results in a ‘critical line’ or surface
KC(V ).
Let κ ≡ (KC−K)/KC and take χ as the ‘correlation length’
defining the average domain in r-space for which the informa-
tion source is primarily dominated by ‘strong’ ties. We begin
by averaging across r-space in terms of ‘clumps’ of length R.
Then, taking Wilson’s (1971) analysis as a starting point, we
choose the renormalization relations as
H[KR, JR,X] = f(R)H[K,J,X]
χ(KR, JR) =
χ(K,J)
R
,
(2)
with f(1) = 1 and J1 = J,K1 = K. The first of these equa-
tions significantly extends Wilson’s treatment. It states that
‘processing capacity,’ as indexed by the source uncertainty of
the system, representing the ‘richness’ of the generalized lan-
guage, grows monotonically as f(R), which must itself be a di-
mensionless function in R, since both H[KR, JR] and H[K,J ]
are themselves dimensionless. Most simply, this would require
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that we replace R by R/R0, where R0 is the ‘characteristic
length’ for the system over which renormalization procedures
are reasonable, then set R0 ≡ 1, i.e. measure length in units
of R0. Wilson’s original analysis focused on free energy den-
sity. Under ‘clumping’, densities must remain the same, so
that if F [KR, JR] is the free energy of the clumped system,
and F [K,J ] is the free energy density before clumping, then
Wilson’s equation (4) is F [K,J ] = R−3F [KR, JR], i.e.
F [KR, JR] = R3F [K,J ].
Remarkably, the renormalization equations are solvable
for a broad class of functions f(R), or more precisely,
f(R/R0), R0 ≡ 1.
The second relation just states that the correlation length
simply scales as R.
It is important to realize that there is no unique renormal-
ization procedure for information sources: other, very subtle,
symmetry relations – not necessarily based on the elementary
physical analog we use here – may well be possible. For exam-
ple McCauley, (1993, p.168) describes the highly counterin-
tuitive renormalization relations needed to understand phase
transition in simple ‘chaotic’ systems. This is important, since
we suspect that biological or social systems may alter their
renormalization properties – equivalent to tuning their phase
transition dynamics – in response to external signals. We
will make much of this possibility, termed ‘universality class
tuning’, below.
To begin, following Wilson, we take f(R) = Rd for some
real number d > 0, and restrict K to near the ‘critical value’
KC . If J → 0, a simple series expansion and some clever
algebra (Wilson, 1971; Binney et al., 1986) gives
H = H0κα
χ =
χ0
κs
(3)
where α, s are positive constants. We provide more biolog-
ically relevant examples below.
Further from the critical point matters are more compli-
cated, appearing to involve Generalized Onsager Relations
and a kind of thermodynamics associated with a Legendre
transform of H, i.e. S ≡ H − KdH/dK (Wallace, 2002a).
Although this extension is quite important to describing be-
haviors away from criticality, the full mathematical detail is
cumbersome and the reader is referred to the references. A
brief discussion will be given below.
An essential insight is that regardless of the particular
renormalization properties, sudden critical point transition is
possible in the opposite direction for this model. That is, we
go from a number of independent, isolated and fragmented
systems operating individually and more or less at random,
into a single large, interlocked, coherent structure, once the
parameter K, the inverse strength of weak ties, falls below
threshold, or, conversely, once the strength of weak ties pa-
rameter P = 1/K becomes large enough.
Thus, increasing nondisjunctive weak ties between them
can bind several different cognitive ‘language’ functions into a
single, embedding hierarchical metalanguage which contains
each as a linked subdialect, and do so in an inherently punc-
tuated manner. This could be a dynamic process, creating a
shifting, ever-changing, pattern of linked cognitive submod-
ules, according to the challenges or opportunities faced by the
organism.
To reiterate somewhat, this heuristic insight can be made
more exact using a rate distortion argument (or, more gener-
ally, using the Joint Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem) as
follows (Wallace, 2002a, b):
Suppose that two ergodic information sources Y and B
begin to interact, to ‘talk’ to each other, i.e. to influence
each other in some way so that it is possible, for example,
to look at the output of B – strings b – and infer something
about the behavior of Y from it – strings y. We suppose it
possible to define a retranslation from the B-language into
the Y-language through a deterministic code book, and call
Yˆ the translated information source, as mirrored by B.
Define some distortion measure comparing paths y to paths
yˆ, d(y, yˆ) (Cover and Thomas, 1991). We invoke the Rate Dis-
tortion Theorem’s mutual information I(Y, Yˆ ), which is the
splitting criterion between high and low probability pairs of
paths. Impose, now, a parametization by an inverse coupling
strengthK, and a renormalization symmetry representing the
global structure of the system coupling. This may be much
different from the renormalization behavior of the individual
components. If K < KC , where KC is a critical point (or
surface), the two information sources will be closely coupled
enough to be characterized as condensed.
In the absence of a distortion measure, we can invoke the
Joint Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem to obtain a similar
result.
We suggest in particular that detailed coupling mechanisms
will be sharply constrained through regularities of grammar
and syntax imposed by limit theorems associated with phase
transition.
Wallace and Wallace (1998, 1999) and Wallace (2002) use
this approach to address certain evolutionary processes in a
relatively unified fashion. These papers, and those of Wal-
lace and Fullilove (1999) and Wallace (2002a), further de-
scribe how biological or social systems might respond to gradi-
ents in information source uncertainty and related quantities
when the system is away from phase transition. Language-on-
network systems, as opposed to physical systems, appear to
diffuse away from concentrations of an ‘instability’ construct
which is related to a Legendre transform of information source
uncertainty, in much the same way entropy is the Legendre
transform of free energy density in a physical system.
Simple thermodynamics addresses physical systems held at
or near equilibrium conditions. Treatment of nonequilibrium,
for example highly dynamic, systems requires significant ex-
tension of thermodynamic theory. The most direct approach
has been the first-order phenomenological theory of Onsager,
which involves relating first order rate changes in system pa-
rametersKj to gradients in physical entropy S, involving ‘On-
sager relation’ equations of the form
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∑
k
Rk,jdKj/dt = ∂S/∂Kj ,
where the Rk,j are characteristic constants of a particular
system and S is defined to be the Legendre transform of free
energy density F ;
S ∝ F −
∑
j
Kj∂F/∂Kj .
The entropy-analog for an information system is, then, the
dimensionless quantity
S ≡ H −
∑
j
Kj∂H/∂Kj ,
or a similar equation in the mutual information I.
Note that in this treatment I or H play the role of free
energy, not entropy, and that their Legendre transform plays
the role of physical entropy. This is a key matter.
For information systems, a parametized ‘instability’,
Q[K] ≡ S − H, is defined from the principal splitting cri-
terion by the relations
Q[K] = −KdH[K]/dK
Q[K] = −KdI[K]/dK
(4)
where H[K] and I[K] are, respectively, information
source uncertainty or mutual information in the Asymptotic
Equipartition, Rate Distortion, or Joint Asymptotic Equipar-
tition Theorems.
Extension of thermodynamic theory to information systems
involves a first order system phenomenological equations anal-
ogous to the Onsager relations, but possibly having very com-
plicated behavior in the Rj,k, in particular not necessarily
producing simple diffusion toward peaks in S. For example,
as discussed, there is evidence that social network structures
are affected by diffusion away from concentrations in the S-
analog. Thus the phenomenological relations affecting the
dynamics of information networks, which are inherently open
systems, may not be governed simply by mechanistic diffusion
toward ‘peaks in entropy’, but may, in first order, display more
complicated behavior.
4.2 ‘Biological’ phase transitions
Now the mathematical detail concealed by the invocation
of the asymptotic limit theorems emerges with a vengeance.
Equation (2) states that the information source and the cor-
relation length, the degree of coherence on the underlying
network, scale under renormalization clustering in chunks of
size R as
H[KR, JR]/f(R) = H[J,K]
χ[KR, JR]R = χ(K,J),
with f(1) = 1,K1 = K,J1 = J , where we have slightly
rearranged terms.
Differentiating these two equations with respect to R, so
that the right hand sides are zero, and solving for dKR/dR
and dJR/dR gives, after some consolidation, expressions of
the form
dKR/dR = u1d log(f)/dR+ u2/R
dJR/dR = v1JRd log(f)/dR+
v2
R
JR.
(5)
The ui, vi, i = 1, 2 are functions of KR, JR, but not explic-
itly of R itself.
We expand these equations about the critical value KR =
KC and about JR = 0, obtaining
dKR/dR = (KR −KC)yd log(f)/dR+ (KR −KC)z/R
dJR/dR = wJRd log(f)/dR+ xJR/R.
(6)
The terms y = du1/dKR|KR=KC , z =
du2/dKR|KR=KC , w = v1(KC , 0), x = v2(KC , 0) are
constants.
Solving the first of these equations gives
KR = KC + (K −KC)Rzf(R)y,
(7)
again remembering that K1 = K,J1 = J, f(1) = 1.
Wilson’s essential trick is to iterate on this relation, which is
supposed to converge rapidly (Binney et al., 1986), assuming
that for KR near KC , we have
KC/2 ≈ KC + (K −KC)Rzf(R)y.
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(8)
We iterate in two steps, first solving this for f(R) in terms
of known values, and then solving for R, finding a value RC
that we then substitute into the first of equations (2) to obtain
an expression for H[K, 0] in terms of known functions and
parameter values.
The first step gives the general result
f(RC) ≈ [KC/(KC −K)]
1/y
21/yRz/yC
.
(9)
Solving this for RC and substituting into the first of equa-
tion (2) gives, as a first iteration of a far more general proce-
dure (e.g. Shirkov and Kovalev, 2001)
H[K, 0] ≈ H[KC/2, 0]
f(RC)
=
H0
f(RC)
χ(K, 0) ≈ χ(KC/2, 0)RC = χ0RC
(10)
which are the essential relationships.
Note that a power law of the form f(R) = Rm,m = 3,
which is the direct physical analog, may not be biologically
reasonable, since it says that ‘language richness’ can grow
very rapidly as a function of increased network size. Such
rapid growth is simply not observed.
If we take the biologically realistic example of non-integral
‘fractal’ exponential growth,
f(R) = Rδ,
(11)
where δ > 0 is a real number which may be quite small, we
can solve equation (8) for RC , obtaining
RC =
[KC/(KC −K)][1/(δy+z)]
21/(δy+z)
(12)
for K near KC . Note that, for a given value of y, we might
want to characterize the relation α ≡ δy + z = constant as
a “tunable universality class relation” in the sense of Albert
and Barabasi (2002).
Substituting this value for RC back into equation (9) gives
a somewhat more complex expression for H than equation
(2), having three parameters, i.e. δ, y, z.
A more biologically interesting choice for f(R) is a loga-
rithmic curve that ‘tops out’, for example
f(R) = m log(R) + 1.
(13)
Again f(1) = 1.
Using Mathematica 4.2 to solve equation (8) for RC gives
RC = [
Q
LambertW [Q exp(z/my)]
]y/z,
(14)
where
Q ≡ (z/my)2−1/y[KCKC −K)]1/y.
The transcendental function LambertW(x) is defined by the
relation
LambertW (x) exp(LambertW (x)) = x.
It arises in the theory of random networks and in renormal-
ization strategies for quantum field theories.
An asymptotic relation for f(R) would be of particular bi-
ological interest, implying that ‘language richness’ increases
to a limiting value with population growth. Such a pattern
is broadly consistent with calculations of the degree of allelic
heterozygosity as a function of population size under a bal-
ance between genetic drift and neutral mutation (Hartl and
Clark, 1997; Ridley, 1996). Taking
f(R) = exp[m(R− 1)/R]
(15)
gives a system which begins at 1 when R=1, and approaches
the asymptotic limit exp(m) as R → ∞. Mathematica 4.2
finds
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RC =
my/z
LambertW [A]
(16)
where
A ≡ (my/z) exp(my/z)[21/y[KC/(KC −K)]−1/y]y/z.
These developments indicate the possibility of taking the
theory significantly beyond arguments by abduction from sim-
ple physical models, although the notorious difficulty of im-
plementing information theory existence arguments will un-
doubtedly persist.
4.3 Universality class distribution
Physical systems undergoing phase transition usually have rel-
atively pure renormalization properties, with quite different
systems clumped into the same ‘universality class’, having
fixed exponents at transition (e.g. Binney et al., 1986). Bio-
logical and social phenomena may be far more complicated:
If we suppose the system of interest to be a mix of sub-
groups with different values of some significant renormaliza-
tion parameter m in the expression for f(R,m), according to
a distribution ρ(m), then we expect the first expression in
equation (1) to generalize as
H[KR, JR] =< f(R,m) > H[K,J ]
≡ H[K,J ]
∫
f(R,m)ρ(m)dm.
(17)
If f(R) = 1 +m log(R) then, given any distribution for m,
we simply obtain
< f(R) >= 1+ < m > log(R)
(18)
where < m > is simply the mean of m over that distribu-
tion.
Other forms of f(R) having more complicated dependencies
on the distributed parameter or parameters, like the power
law Rδ, do not produce such a simple result. Taking ρ(δ) as
a normal distribution, for example, gives
< Rδ >= R<δ> exp[(1/2)(log(Rσ))2],
(19)
where σ2 is the distribution variance. The renormalization
properties of this function can be determined from equation
(8), and the calculation is left to the reader as an exercise,
best done in Mathematica 4.2 or above.
Thus the information dynamic phase transition properties
of mixed systems will not in general be simply related to those
of a single subcomponent, a matter of possible empirical im-
portance: If sets of relevant parameters defining renormaliza-
tion universality classes are indeed distributed, experiments
observing pure phase changes may be very difficult. Tun-
ing among different possible renormalization strategies in re-
sponse to external pressures would result in even greater am-
biguity in recognizing and classifying information dynamic
phase transitions.
We believe that important aspects of mechanism may be
reflected in the combination of renormalization properties and
the details of their distribution across subsystems.
In sum, real biological, social, or interacting biopsychosocial
systems are likely to have very rich patterns of phase transi-
tion which may not display the simplistic, indeed, literally
elemental, purity familiar to physicists. Overall mechanisms
will, we believe, still remain significantly constrained by our
theory, in the general sense of probability limit theorems.
4.4 Universality class tuning: the fluctuat-
ing dynamic threshold
Next we iterate the general argument onto the process of
phase transition itself, producing our model of consciousness
as a tunable neural workspace subject to inherent punctuated
detection of external events.
As described above, an essential character of physical sys-
tems subject to phase transition is that they belong to par-
ticular ‘universality classes’. Again, this means that the ex-
ponents of power laws describing behavior at phase transition
will be the same for large groups of markedly different sys-
tems, with ‘natural’ aggregations representing fundamental
class properties (e.g. Binney et al., 1986).
It is our contention that biological or social systems un-
dergoing phase transition analogs need not be constrained to
such classes, and that ‘universality class tuning’, meaning the
strategic alteration of parameters characterizing the renor-
malization properties of punctuation, might well be possible.
Here we focus on the tuning of parameters within a single,
given, renormalization relation. Clearly, however, wholesale
shifts of renormalization properties must ultimately be con-
sidered as well, a matter we cannot pursue further here.
Universality class tuning has been observed in models of
‘real world’ networks. As Albert and Barabasi (2002) put it,
“The inseparability of the topology and dynam-
ics of evolving networks is shown by the fact that
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[the exponents defining universality class] are related
by [a] scaling relation..., underlying the fact that a
network’s assembly uniquely determines its topol-
ogy. However, in no case are these exponents unique.
They can be tuned continuously...”
We suppose that a structured external environment, which
we take itself to be an appropriately regular information
source Y ‘engages’ a modifiable cognitive system. The en-
vironment begins to write an image of itself on the cognitive
system in a distorted manner permitting definition of a mu-
tual information I[K] splitting criterion according to the Rate
Distortion or Joint Asymptotic Equipartition Theorems. K
is an inverse coupling parameter between system and environ-
ment (Wallace, 2002a, b). According to our development, at
punctuation – near some critical point KC – the systems be-
gin to interact very strongly indeed, and we may write, near
KC , taking as the starting point the simple physical model of
equation (3),
I[K] ≈ I0[KC −K
KC
]α.
For a physical system α is fixed, determined by the under-
lying ‘universality class’. Here we will allow α to vary, and,
in the section below, to itself respond explicitly to signals.
Normalizing KC and I0 to 1, we obtain,
I[K] ≈ (1−K)α.
(20)
The horizontal line I[K] = 1 corresponds to α = 0, while
α = 1 gives a declining straight line with unit slope which
passes through 0 at K = 1. Consideration shows there are
progressively sharper transitions between the necessary zero
value at K = 1 and the values defined by this relation for
0 < K,α < 1. The rapidly rising slope of transition with
declining α is, we assert, of considerable significance.
The instability associated with the splitting criterion I[K]
is defined by
Q[K] ≡ −KdI[K]/dK = αK(1−K)α−1,
(21)
and is singular at K = KC = 1 for 0 < α < 1. Following
earlier work (Wallace and Wallace, 1998, 1999; Wallace and
Fullilove, 1999; Wallace, 2002a), we interpret this to mean
that values of 0 < α 1 are highly unlikely for real systems,
since Q[K], in this model, represents a kind of barrier for
‘social’ information systems, in particular interacting neural
network modules, a matter we will explore further below.
On the other hand, smaller values of α mean that the sys-
tem is far more efficient at responding to the adaptive de-
mands imposed by the embedding structured environment,
since the mutual information which tracks the matching of
internal response to external demands, I[K], rises more and
more quickly toward the maximum for smaller and smaller α
as the inverse coupling parameter K declines below KC = 1.
That is, systems able to attain smaller α are more responsive
to external signals than those characterized by larger values,
in this model, but smaller values will be harder to reach, and
can probably be done so only at some considerable physio-
logical or opportunity cost: focused conscious action takes
resources, of one form or another.
In a subsequent section we will make these considerations
formal, modeling the role of contextual and energy constraints
on the relations between Q, I, and other system properties.
The more biologically realistic renormalization strategies
given above produce sets of several parameters defining the
universality class, whose tuning gives behavior much like that
of α in this simple example.
We can formally iterate the phase transition argument on
this calculation to obtain our version of tunable consciousness,
focusing on paths of universality class parameters.
Suppose the renormalization properties of a language-on-
a network system at some ‘time’ k are characterized by a
set of parameters Ak ≡ αk1 , ..., αkm. Fixed parameter val-
ues define a particular universality class for the renormal-
ization. We suppose that, over a sequence of ‘times’, the
universality class properties can be characterized by a path
xn = A0, A1, ..., An−1 having significant serial correlations
which, in fact, permit definition of an adiabatically piece-
wise memoryless ergodic information source associated with
the paths xn. We call that source X.
We further suppose, in the now-usual manner, that the set
of external (or internal, systemic) signals impinging on con-
sciousness is also highly structured and forms another infor-
mation source Y which interacts not only with the system
of interest globally, but specifically with its universality class
properties as characterized by X. Y is necessarily associated
with a set of paths yn.
We pair the two sets of paths into a joint path, zn ≡ (xn, yy)
and invoke an inverse coupling parameter, K, between the
information sources and their paths. This leads, by the ar-
guments above, to phase transition punctuation of I[K], the
mutual information between X and Y, under either the Joint
Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem or under limitation by
a distortion measure, through the Rate Distortion Theorem
(Cover and Thomas, 1991). Again, see Wallace (2002a, b)
for more details of the argument. The essential point is that
I[K] is a splitting criterion under these theorems, and thus
partakes of the homology with free energy density which we
have invoked above.
Activation of universality class tuning, our version of at-
tentional focusing, then becomes itself a punctuated event in
response to increasing linkage between the organism and an
external structured signal or some particular system of inter-
nal events.
We note, without further calculation, that another path to
the fluctuating dynamic threshold might be through a sec-
ond order iteration similar to that just above, but focused on
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the parameters defining the universality class distributions of
section 4.3.
Following the recent arguments of Gillooly et al. (2004) on
how metabolic rate can calibrate the molecular clock of evo-
lutionary process, and taking into account the crude analogy
between punctuated equilibrium in evolutionary, and learn-
ing plateaus in cognitive, systems (e.g. Wallace, 2002b), it
seems likely that the generalized Onsager relation arguments
used above can be iterated as well. As we will show in sec-
tion 6.2 below, such iteration must take place in the context
of competing energy constraints defined at different levels of
organization.
The question becomes, as in the study of the idiotypic net-
works of immune function, the rate of convergence of the iter-
ative process. It seems likely that a small number of iterations
will suffice to explain most current controlled experiments.
More generally, the development of Wallace (2003) suggests
the possibility of one or more tunable internal ‘retinas’ for cog-
nitive process which could be adjusted to accelerate conver-
gence. This idea has certain interesting implications, which
we now explore.
4.5 The simplest tunable retina
The development above, in terms of paths in renormalization-
parameter space, can be significantly extended.
We expand our perspective, and now suppose that thresh-
old behavior in conscious reaction involves some elaborate
system of nonlinear relationships defining the set of renor-
malization parameters Ak ≡ αk1 , ..., αkm above. Our principal
assumption is that there is a tunable ‘zero order state’, and
that changes about that state are, in first order, relatively
small, although their effects on punctuated process may not
be at all small. Thus, given an initial m-dimensional vector
Ak, the parameter vector at time k + 1, Ak+1, can, in first
order, be written as
Ak+1 ≈ Rk+1Ak
(22)
where Rt+1 is an m×m matrix, having m2 components.
If the initial parameter vector at time k = 0 is A0, then at
time k we will have
Ak = RkRk−1...R1A0
(23)
The interesting correlates of consciousness are, in this de-
velopment, now represented by an information-theoretic path
defined by the sequence of operators Rk, each member having
m2 components. The grammar and syntax of the path de-
fined by these operators is associated with a dual information
source, in the usual manner.
The effect of an information source of external signals, Y in
the section above, is now seen in terms of more complex joint
paths in Y and R-space whose behavior is, again, governed
by a mutual information splitting criterion according to the
JAEPT.
The complex sequence in m2-dimensional R-space has,
by this construction, been projected down onto a parallel
path, the smaller set of m-dimensional α-parameter vectors
A0, ..., Ak.
If the punctuated tuning of consciousness is now charac-
terized by a ‘higher’ dual information source – an embedding
generalized language – so that the paths of the operators Rk
are autocorrelated, then the autocorrelated paths in Ak rep-
resent output of a parallel information source which is, given
Rate Distortion limitations, apparently a grossly simplified,
and hence highly distorted, picture of the ‘higher’ conscious
process represented by the R-operators, having m as opposed
to m×m components.
High levels of distortion may not necessarily be the case for
such a structure.
Let us examine a single iteration in more detail, assum-
ing now there is a (tunable) zero reference state, R0, for the
sequence of operators Rk, and that
Ak+1 = (R0 + δRk+1)Ak,
(24)
where δRk is ‘small’ in some sense compared to R0.
Note that in this analysis the operators Rk are, implic-
itly, determined by linear regression. We thus can invoke a
quasi-diagonalization in terms of R0. Let Q be the matrix of
eigenvectors which Jordan-block-diagonalizes R0. Then we
write
QAk+1 = (QR0Q−1 +QδRk+1Q−1)QAk
(25)
If we take QAk to be an eigenvector of R0, say Yj with
eigenvalue λj , we can rewrite this equation as a generalized
spectral expansion
Yk+1 = (J+ δJk+1)Yj ≡ λjYj + δYk+1
= λjYj +
n∑
i=1
aiYi
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(26)
where J is a block-diagonal matrix, δJk+1 ≡ QRk+1Q−1,
and δYk+1 has been expanded in terms of a spectrum of the
eigenvectors of R0, with
|ai|  |λj |, |ai+1|  |ai|.
(27)
The point is that, provided R0 has been ‘tuned’ so that
this condition is true, the first few terms in the spectrum of
this iteration of the eigenstate will contain most of the es-
sential information about δRk+1. We envision this as similar
to the detection of color in the retina, where three overlap-
ping non-orthogonal ‘eigenmodes’ of response are sufficient to
characterize a huge plethora of color sensation. Here, if such
a spectral expansion is possible, a very small number of ob-
served eigenmodes would suffice to permit identification of a
vast range of changes, so that the rate-distortion constraints
become quite modest. That is, there will not be much dis-
tortion in the reduction from paths in R-space to paths in
A-space.
Some reflection shows this calculation suggests that, if
consciousness indeed has something like a tunable retina –
crudely, if ‘the eye of the mind’ has a fovea – then appropri-
ately chosen observable correlates of consciousness may, at a
particular time, and under particular circumstances, actually
provide very good descriptions of conscious process, a matter
having implication for the resolution of certain philosophically
‘hard’ problems, e.g. ‘the redness of red’ and the like.
In this regard, a recapitulation of the visual retina is of
interest.
4.6 Tuning the visual retina
The tunable retina is, in fact, quite an old idea, as is the
information-theoretic approach, which Schawbe and Ober-
mayer (2002) describe as follows:
“Adaptation is a widespread phenomenon in ner-
vous systems, and it happens on multiple time-
scales, i.e. the activity-dependent refinement cor-
tical maps (weeks), perceptual learning (hours and
days) or contrast adaptation (seconds) in the pri-
mary visual cortex. It is reasonable to hypothesize
that the functional role of these adaptation mecha-
nisms is to provide flexibility to function under vary-
ing external conditions. Using concepts from infor-
mation theory [e.g. Cover and Thomas, 1991] the
specific idea that neuronal codes constitute efficient
representations of the sensory world has been formu-
lated (Attneave, 1954; Barlow, 1959; Atick, 1992).
Subsequently the adaptation processes were mainly
viewed as a signature of an ongoing optimization of
sensory systems to changing environments as char-
acterized by their statistical properties, i.e. as an
optimization of the information transfer between the
ensemble of stimuli and the neuronal responses.”
Brenner et al. (2000) put it thus:
“One of the major problems in processing the
complex dynamic signals that occur in the natural
environment is providing an efficient representation
of these data. More than 40 years ago, Attneave
(1954) and Barlow (1961) suggested that steps in
the neural processing of information could be under-
stood as solutions to this problem of efficient repre-
sentation. This idea was later developed by many
groups, especially in the context of the visual sys-
tem. Efficient representation requires a matching of
the coding strategy to the statistical structure of in-
coming signals...
The mean light level, for example, changes by
orders of magnitude as we leave a sunny region and
enter a forest. Adaptation to mean light level en-
sures that our visual responses are matched to the
average signal in real time, thus maintaining sensi-
tivity to the fluctuations around this mean.”
The mechanism of light level tuning for the visual retina
involves a shift from a band pass Fourier spatial frequency fil-
ter at elevated levels of luminance, where noise is not a major
concern, and high frequency spatial data can be processed,
to a low frequency pass spatial frequency filter at low lumi-
nance, a regime where quantum noise dominates. Here, large
shapes, without color, become the objects of attention. As
Atick (1992) shows elegantly, quantum noise considerations
can predict visual retina spatial filter performance from first
principles, without much parameter fitting.
The model of section 4.5, which focused on altering oper-
ator spectral properties to determine Rate Distortion behav-
ior, is roughly analogous. Rate Distortion arguments, unlike
Atick’s (1992) energy functional-analog minimization, are in-
dependent of the particular distortion measure chosen, but in
a complicated  - δ sense, which we briefly explore below.
In particular, we are led to suspect that, for internal retinas
like the one we propose for consciousness (or, elsewhere, for
immune cognition; Wallace, 2003), generalized noise does not
have a simple quantum structure, and optimizations may not
be at all straightforward.
The argument is as follows: We suppose that the version of
the ‘real world’ to be perceived by the internal retina has
a high dimensional, and extremely complicated, alphabet,
which is projected by that retina onto a simpler, e.g. lower
dimensional, alphabet, so that information will inevitably be
lost. Suppose that the full (internal) world can be charac-
terized by an information source X and its retinal projection
by a simpler information source Y such that paths of signals
generated by X, of the form x = x0, x2, ..., xn, ..., are mapped
by some many-to-one operator R onto paths y. We permit
definition of any distortion metric d(x, y) = d(x,Rx) which
measures the average deviation of x from y.
The Rate Distortion Theorem states that, for any chosen
maximum average distortion such that d(x,Rx) <  there is
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a maximum possible transmission rate δ such that if X is
mapped by R onto Y at a transmission rate (i.e. channel
capacity) C < δ, then the average distortion will be less than
. The mutual information between X and Y = RX provides
the essential splitting criterion.
If the organism has much time, then the retina operator
R can indeed remain fixed, and its rate of operation simply
slowed down until the  constraint on error is matched.
This is clearly not an option for animals who are hunted
(or hunt) in the night. The rate of signal recognition becomes
very important, hence the change from spatial band pass to
low pass filtering, as a means of maintaining transmission rate
at the expense of perceived detail: tunable coarse-graining.
The Appendix gives an example of coarse graining.
If consciousness has, as we all believe, quintessential sur-
vival value, then spectral tuning of R to optimize both  and
δ under changing conditions becomes likewise a priority, but
the constraints may not be simply defined by quantum noise,
as in the visual retina, and the elegant calculation of Atick and
Redlich (1990) is not sufficient. Indeed, like biological univer-
sality class tuning, there appear to be whole sets of monotonic
relations between  and δ which are subject to tuning.
There are further complications: tunable internal retina ar-
guments can be inverted to produce global structures in much
the same way local tangent spaces can be linked together by
an atlas structure to create a larger-scale differential geometry
(e.g. Sternberg, 1964). That is, following our development,
the fovea of the mind’s eye is, in fact, a local projection of
a high order or complex alphabet information source onto a
lower order, simpler alphabet, information source, done in
a manner to locally optimize certain rate-distortion factors.
An algebraic geometer at this point can invoke any number of
globalization theorems to canonically construct a larger em-
bedding manifold having interesting properties.
Such larger structures, however, are not unique, and not
at all likely to be simple. We examine in more detail the
argument-by-abduction from differential geometry.
4.7 The torus and the sphere
The tunable retina atlas we have proposed for dual informa-
tion sources of cognitive processes is taken in concept from
differential geometry, and an example can help show where
this approach is leading.
We consider the two-dimensional torus and sphere within
three dimensional space. The sphere is most simply defined
as the set of points a fixed distance from some given point
of origin. The torus is a little more complicated: take a 2-
square in three dimensional space. Roll it so the top meets
the bottom, then stretch the resulting cylinder until the ends
meet. More directly, identify top and bottom edges of the
square, and then identify the left and right edges.
These are fundamentally different constructions: Any
closed one dimensional loop on the surface of a sphere may be
continuously shrunk to a point. This is not true for the torus,
since a closed loop which rings the torus cannot be shrunk
down to a point, but is limited to size of the torus itself.
On the other hand, both structures are two dimensional
surfaces in three-space: at any point on either a sphere or
a torus, a ‘small enough’ patch containing that point can be
mapped exactly onto a two dimensional tangent plane tuned
to that point, without doing violence to the essential differ-
ence between the surfaces. This is analogous to our elemen-
tary tunable retina construction which locally maps a path of
operators having m2 components each onto a path of vectors
having only m components, with minimal loss of information
and maximal transmission rate.
It is important to realize that the analogy with differen-
tial geometry is limited at best. We are quite definitely
not proposing a pseudoriemannian geometry based on the
‘Fisher-information metric’. Rather, our manifold is an infor-
mation source producing complex symbolic strings, and the
R-projection onto a lower dimensional or coarse-grained infor-
mation source is done by means of a local tuning which jointly
minimizes distortion and maximizes transmission, subject to
some embedding constraint structure defining the relation be-
tween them, which may itself be tunable. Distortion can be
measured by any number of appropriate measures, according
to the Rate Distortion Theorem. The result is far more like
a stochastic version of a Finsler, rather than a Riemannian,
system.
We are thus proposing what might be called a Rate Dis-
tortion manifold, instantiated through a locally-tuned coarse
graining which has a larger scale Rate Distortion topology.
Thus, while the tunable retina is postulated to be a lo-
cal coarse-grained construction for cognitive processes like the
tangent space in differential geometry, so that the ‘redness of
red’ may well be empirically indistinguishable between indi-
viduals having normal vision, the threshold at which the red
signal becomes conscious, its meaning once it becomes con-
scious, and the possible and likely responses of the individual
to it, are conditioned by larger global - i.e. topological - struc-
tures. These reflect the interaction of constraints of individual
development and learning with the embedding culture which
conditions that development and learning, matters which will
determine larger global properties. These are the cognitive
and conscious analogs of the difference between the torus and
the sphere.
We now attempt to make these considerations more ex-
plicit.
5 Expanding the workspace
The Rate Distortion and Joint Asymptotic Equipartition The-
orems are generalizations of the Shannon-McMillan Theorem
which examine the interaction of two information sources,
with and without the constraint of a fixed average distor-
tion or some particular transmission rate target. We con-
duct one more iteration, and require a generalization of the
SMT in terms of the splitting criterion for triplets as op-
posed to single or double stranded patterns. The tool for
this is at the core of what is termed network information the-
ory [Cover and Thomas, 1991, Theorem 14.2.3]. Suppose we
have three (piecewise adiabatically memoryless) ergodic in-
formation sources, Y1, Y2 and Y3. We assume Y3 constitutes a
critical embedding context for Y1 and Y2 so that, given three
sequences of length n, the probability of a particular triplet
of sequences is determined by conditional probabilities with
respect to Y3:
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P (Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, Y3 = y3) =
Πni=1p(y1i|y3i)p(y2i|y3i)p(y3i).
(28)
That is, Y1 and Y2 are, in some measure, driven by their
interaction with Y3
Then, in analogy with previous analyses, triplets of se-
quences can be divided by a splitting criterion into two sets,
having high and low probabilities respectively. For large n the
number of triplet sequences in the high probability set will be
determined by the relation [Cover and Thomas, 1992, p. 387]
N(n) ∝ exp[nI(Y1;Y2|Y3)],
(29)
where splitting criterion is given by
I(Y1;Y2|Y3) ≡
H(Y3) +H(Y1|Y3) +H(Y2|Y3)−H(Y1, Y2, Y3)
We can then examine mixed cognitive/adaptive phase tran-
sitions analogous to learning plateaus (Wallace, 2002b) in the
splitting criterion I(Y1, Y2|Y3), which characterizes the syn-
ergistic interaction between Y3, taken as an embedding con-
text, and the cognitive processes characterized by Y1 and Y2.
These transitions delineate the various stages of the chronic
infection, which are embodied in the slowly varying ‘piece-
wise adiabatically memoryless ergodic’ phase between tran-
sitions. Again, our results are exactly analogous to the El-
dredge/Gould model of evolutionary punctuated equilibrium.
We can, if necessary, extend this model to any number of
interacting information sources, Y1, Y2, ..., Ys conditional on
an external context Z in terms of a splitting criterion defined
by
I(Y1; ...;Ys|Z) = H(Z) +
s∑
j=1
H(Yj |Z)−H(Y1, ..., Ys, Z),
(30)
where the conditional Shannon uncertainties H(Yj |Z) are
determined by the appropriate direct and conditional proba-
bilities.
Note that this simple-seeming extension opens a Pandora’s
box in the study of ‘mind-body interaction’ and the impacts
of culture and history on individual cognition. We now have
a tool for examining the interpenetration of a broad range of
cognitive physiological, psychological, and social submodules
– not just neural substructures – with each other and with
embedding contextual cultural language so characteristic of
human hypersociality, all within the further context of struc-
tured psychosocial stress. Wallace (2003) analyzes the impli-
cations for understanding comorbid mind/body dysfunction,
and provides a laundry list of physiological, psychological, and
social cognitive modules associated with health and disease.
Bennett and Hacker (2003) define the ‘mereological fallacy’
in neuroscience as the assignment, to parts of an animal,
of those characteristics which are properties of the whole.
Humans, through both their embedding in cognitive social
networks, and their secondary epigenetic inheritance system
of culture, are even more than ‘simply’ individual animals.
Equation (30) implies the possibility of extending the global
neuronal workspace model of consciousness to include both
internal cognitive physiological systems and embedding cog-
nitive and other structures, providing a natural approach to
evading that fallacy.
Equation (30) is itself subject to significant generalization.
The single information source Z is seen here as invariant,
not affected by, but affecting, cross talk with the informa-
tion sources for which it serves as the driving context. Sup-
pose there is an interacting system of contexts, acting more
slowly than the global neuronal workspace, but communicat-
ing within itself. It should be possible, at first order, to divide
the full system into two sections, one ‘fast’, containing the
Yj , and the other ‘slow’, containing the series of information
sources Zk. The fast system instantiates the conscious neu-
ronal workspace, including crosstalk, while the slow system
constitutes an embedding context for the fast, but one which
engages in its own pattern of crosstalk. Then the extended
splitting criterion, which we write as
I(Y1, ..., Yj |Z1, ..., Zk),
(31)
becomes something far more complicated than equation
(30). This must be expressed in terms of sums of appropriate
Shannon uncertainties, a complex task which will be individ-
ually contingent on the particular forms of context and their
interrelations.
Our approach, while arguably more general than dynamic
systems theory, can incorporate a subset of dynamic systems
models through an appropriate coarse graining, a standard
construction described at more length in the Appendix.
To reiterate somewhat, the essential trick is to show that
a system has a ‘high frequency limit’ so that an appropriate
coarse graining catches the dynamics of fundamental impor-
tance, while filtering out ‘high frequency noise’.
Taking this analysis into consideration, the model of equa-
tion (31) can be seen, from a dynamic systems theory per-
spective, as constituting a ‘double coarse-graining’ in which
the Zk represent a ‘slow’ system which serves as a driving
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conditional context for the ‘fast’ Yj of the global neuronal
workspace.
We can envision a ‘multi’ (or even distributed) coarse grain-
ing in which, for example, low, medium, and high, frequency
phenomena can affect each other. The mathematics of such
extension appears straightforward but is exponentially com-
plicated. In essence we must give meaning to the notation
I(Y1, ..., Yj |X1, ..., Xk|Z1, ..., Zq)
(32)
where the Yj represent the fast-acting cognitive modules of
the global neuronal workspace, the Xk are intermediate rate
effects such as emotional structure, long-term goals, immune
and local social network function, and the like, and the Zq are
even slower-changing factors such as cultural structure, em-
bedding patterns of psychosocial stress, the legacy of personal
developmental and community history, and so on.
Such analysis is consistent with, but clearly extends, the
‘standard model’ of global workspace theory.
We are suggesting, ultimately, that culture, developmental
history, and structured stress serve as essential contexts-of-
context, in the sense of Baars and Franklin (2003), defining
a further hierarchy of externally-imposed constraints to the
functioning of individual consciousness.
6 Energy efficiency and conscious-
ness
6.1 Simple neural modules
A pioneering study by Levy and Baxter (1996) explores the
energy costs of neural coding strategies, a matter which will
prove to be of some interest here. To paraphrase Laughlin
and Sejnowski (2003), detailed analysis comparing the rep-
resentational capacity of signals distributed across a popula-
tion of neurons with the costs involved suggests sparse coding
schemes, in which a small proportion of cells signal at any
one time, use little energy for signaling but have a high rep-
resentational capacity because there are many different ways
in which a small number of signals can be distributed among
a large number of neurons. This is mitigated by the energetic
cost of maintaining a large number of neurons, if they rarely
signal. Thus there is an optimum proportion of active cells
which depends on the ratio between the cost of maintaining
a neuron at rest and the extra cost of sending a signal. When
signals are relatively expensive, it is best to distribute a few
of them among a large number of cells. When cells are ex-
pensive, it is more efficient to use few of them and to get all
of them signaling.
A simplified version of the Levy and Baxter argument is as
follows:
Suppose there are n binary neurons, taking an active value
of 1 with probability p and an inactive value of 0 with prob-
ability 1 − p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Classically, each binary neuron has
a ‘channel capacity’ given by
h(p) = −p log(p)− (1− p) log(1− p).
(33)
See Ash (1990) or Cover and Thomas (1991) for details.
The maximum possible channel capacity of n such neurons
would be the sum of n independent channels, so that
H(p) ≤ nh(p).
(34)
If an active neuron has r times the energy requirements
of an inactive one, then the average energy consumed by an
active fraction p of n total neurons is just
E(p, r) = npr + n(1− p) = n(1 + p(r − 1)),
(35)
where, again, we are measuring in energy units of an inac-
tive neuron.
The ratio of maximum possible channel capacity to energy
consumption is, then,
H(p)/E(p, r) ≤ f(p, r) ≡ h(p)/(1 + p(r − 1)),
(36)
independent of n.
If we choose a typical value for r, say r = 100, so that a
working binary neuron consumes 100 times the energy of a
resting one (e.g. Lennie, 2003), then solving the extremum
problem
df(p, 100)/dp = 0
for p numerically gives p = p∗ ≈ 0.0334, so that the most
energy efficient neural system, in this model, will have only
about three percent of its neurons active at any one time, a
startling ‘sparse code’ result.
The peak of f(p, r) as a function of p for even large fixed
r is actually very broad, having a significant full width at
half maximum (FWHM). In the example for f(p, 100), half-
maximum is met at p = 0.0034, 0.3864, so that FWHM=
0.3830, which is not inconsiderable.
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Levy and Baxter (1996) examine a more complicated model
which has, comparatively, narrower peaks than the simple bi-
nary neuron, but these too have rather large FWHM, sug-
gesting that the maximization of efficiency is at best highly
approximate: large fractions of neurons may, apparently, be
mobilized for short times, dependent on the ability to meet
the energy demand.
Balasubramanian et al. (2001) examine more general met-
rics of neural efficiency, and the role of noise, using both
a Lagrange multiplier and a complicated iterative Arimoto-
Blahut optimization strategy, making empirical application to
the distribution of burst sizes in the visual retina.
6.2 Interacting modules: the global
workspace
Alternative – and perhaps competing – metrics may apply
at higher levels of organization, in particular to the global
neuronal workspace itself.
Figures 1 and 2 show the results of a simple calculation
at a level more complicated than that represented by equa-
tions (35) and (36). We assume that neural modules interact
within themselves according to what might be characterized
as ‘strong ties’, i.e. those which disjointly partition a struc-
ture according to some equivalence class relationship, indeed
permitting the identification of modules which individually
follow something like equations (35) and (36). To attain con-
sciousness, however, these modules must interact with each
other according to a ‘weak’ tie structure which does not dis-
jointly partition into equivalence classes. Call the average
probability of weak tie coupling across neural modules P and
set K = 1/P .
We let the ‘channel capacity’ of the coupling across neu-
ral modules be a reverse S-shaped curve, as a function of
K = 1/P , taken here as proportional to an Error Function.
Since the source uncertainty of any information source - cog-
nitive or otherwise - is constrained to be less than or equal
to channel capacity, in figure 1 we express H(K) as having
the same functional dependence. We assume the energy con-
sumed by consciousness is, as in the Levy and Baxter model,
proportional to P , hence to 1/K in figure 1. Note that both
curves have been adjusted to similar maxima.
Figure 2 shows, respectively, the ratios of H and Q =
−KdH/dK to energy, as a function of K, for this model.
Here, again, P = 1 is assumed to consume 100 times the en-
ergy of P = 0. The plots have also been adjusted to similar
maxima.
We, again, assume for complex ‘social’ constructs, as op-
posed to the individual elementary structures which compose
them, that, while attempting to maximize H/E, the system
attempts to minimize the experience of disorder, i.e. to min-
imize Q/E = [−KdH/dK]/E.
In terms of avoiding disorder, two regimes of figure 2 are
‘stable’: to the left and the right of the peak in Q/E. On the
other hand, H/E is at a maximum for some P < 1 to the left
of the peak in Q/E. Thus the peak in Q/E = [−KdH/dK]/E
serves to ‘lock in’ the system to either a state in which there
is much cross-talk between interacting neural modules - con-
sciousness - or a state in which there is little cross-talk – un-
consciousness or sleep. The transition between the two states
should be highly punctuated, according to this model, as the
system overcomes the barrier defined by Q/E.
This interpretation is consistent with recent work by Lopez-
Ruiz et al. (2004), who found a bistable waking/sleeping
bifurcation in complex networks defined by mean-field mul-
tiplicative coupling among first-neighbor nodes.
It should, in addition, be clear that the second order uni-
versality class tuning of section 4.4, which we use to define
the fluctuating dynamic threshold of consciousness, makes the
most sense on the left hand side of figure 2, as a function of
the waking state.
Clearly, questions of energy use vs. functional optimiza-
tion for cognitive/conscious processes require further study,
particularly as regards the impacts of multiple parallel or hi-
erarchical organization levels. The difference between these
two examples – the efficiency of neural modules vs. that of
assemblies of interacting cognitive modules – might be seen
as analogous to the contrast between the interest of individ-
uals within an organization, who may wish to optimize their
personal income per unit effort, vs. the interest of the orga-
nization itself, which is attempting to maximize its ‘market
share’. These are not at all the same goals, and the orga-
nizational priorities will likely be at considerable odds with
the individual interests of the employees. Under a hierarchy,
then, optimization may become a matter of conflict between
competing levels. The FWHM of the different optimizations
may represent the solution to mitigating that conflict.
6.3 Reconsidering fMRI
Recently Shulman et al. (2003) reexamined functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) from the perspective of global
workspace theory. They find that the high energy consump-
tion of the brain at rest and its quantitative usage for neu-
rotransmission reflect a high level of neuronal activity for
the non-stimulated brain. This high activity, in their view,
supports a reinterpretation of functional imaging data, e.g.,
where the large baseline signal has commonly been discarded.
Independent measurements of energy consumption obtained
from calibrated fMRI equaled percentage changes in neuronal
spiking rate measured by electrodes during sensory stimula-
tion at two depths of anesthesia. These quantitative biophys-
ical relationships between energy consumption and neuronal
activity, they claim, provide novel insights into the nature of
brain function. They propose the high resting brain activity
includes the global interactions constituting the subjective as-
pects of consciousness. Anesthesia, by lowering the total firing
rates correlates with the loss of consciousness. They conclude
that these results, which measure localized neuronal response
and distinguish inputs of peripheral neurons from inputs of
neurons from other brain regions, fit comfortably into the
global neuronal workspace model of Dehaene, Changeux, and
others.
One is tempted to interpret the ‘large baseline signal’ in
terms of the operator R0 of equation (24), and the fMRI-
measured differences in terms of that equation’s δRk+1, lead-
ing ‘naturally’ into the tunable retina arguments associated
with the Rate Distortion manifold/atlas topologies discussed
above.
A second temptation is to reformulate the parametization
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of the consciousness phase transition itself in terms of base-
line energy consumption, possibly producing a series of punc-
tuated changes corresponding to different levels of conscious-
ness, much as shown in figures 1 and 2.
These matters remain to be explored.
Next we attempt to place the general argument in a more
comprehensive methodological context.
7 Toward a General Cognitive
Model
The General Linear Model so familiar to empirical researchers
is based on several critical assumptions. In the simplest case,
following Snedecor and Cochran (1979, p. 141), there are
three essential restrictions on the relation between indepen-
dent and dependent variates X and Y :
1. For each selected X there is a Normal distribution of Y
from which the sample value of Y is drawn at random. If de-
sired, more than one Y may be drawn from each distribution.
2. The population of values of Y corresponding to a selected
X has a mean µ that lies on the straight line
µ = α+ β(X − Xˆ) = α+ βx,
where α and β are parameters to be estimated. Xˆ is the
mean of X.
3. In each population the standard deviation of Y about
its mean α + βx has the same value, assumed constant as x
varies.
The mathematical model is specified concisely by the equa-
tion
Y = α+ βx+ .
where  is a random variable drawn from an appropriate
Normal distribution.
The central problem then becomes the statistical estimation
of the parameters α and β from observational data.
Variants of this model range from multiple regression, to
canonical correlation, and, more recently, our own work on
estimating system response to external perturbation (e.g. D.
Wallace and R. Wallace, 2000). Similar methods can, of
course, be used for more complicated ‘linearizable’ problems,
for example fitting to polynomials or exponentials in x.
Indeed, as Anderson (1971) comments, many of the statisti-
cal techniques used in time series analysis are actually those of
regression analysis – classical least squares theory – or adap-
tations or analogs of them, often translated from time-domain
to frequency domain via Fourier or related transforms.
All such methods are, however, organized around the Cen-
tral Limit Theorem.
Languages, i.e. information sources, are different, being
much more highly structured, and cannot be addressed in the
same manner. Here we, in effect, propose a General Cog-
nitive Model for punctuation and other behavior in cogni-
tive systems based, not on the Central Limit Theorem, but
rather on the Shannon-McMillan Theorem, as modulated by
the obvious homology with free energy density. The trick
is to associate a cognitive process with a dual information
source which is adiabatically piecewise memoryless ergodic,
using renormalization formalism at punctuation, and gener-
alized Onsager relations away from punctuation. The model
may, itself, be iterated to higher order in renormalization pa-
rameters.
The central problem of the GCM then becomes, in anal-
ogy with the GLM, the estimation, from observational data,
of the renormalization relation and its ‘universality class’ pa-
rameters, which may be both tunable and distributed, and,
away from punctuation, the generalized Onsager relations.
This must be done in the context of possible complications
resulting from second-order punctuation.
The different possible renormalization schemes or Onsager
relations for the GCM are analogous to different possible poly-
nomial or exponential fittings in the GLM.
Generalized parameter estimation for the model appears
fiendishly difficult, except perhaps under very restricted ex-
perimental conditions.
In defense of the proposed empirical technique, cognitive
and conscious processes are themselves fiendishly compli-
cated, and what we have done may well be as simple as
things can realistically be made – the cognitive equivalent of a
straight line regression relation or simple time series analysis.
As is often true for the GLM, analysis of ‘residuals’ from
fitting a GCM might well provide critical scientific insight. In
sum, the GCM could serve as a compelling theoretical bench-
mark against which to compare real data.
8 Discussion and conclusions
We have constructed a punctuated, information-dynamic sta-
tistical model of the global neuronal workspace – the GCM –
which incorporates a second-order and similarly punctuated
universality class tuning linked to detection and interpreta-
tion of structured external signals. The model, which features
a ‘tunable retina’ atlas/manifold topology, suggests that tun-
ing the punctuated activation of attention to those signals per-
mits more rapid and appropriate response, but at increased
physiological or other opportunity cost: unconscious process-
ing is clearly more efficient, if the organism can get away
with it. On the other hand, if the environment is threaten-
ing, the organism can’t always get away with it, suggesting
a strong evolutionary imperative for a dynamic global neural
workspace.
Linkage across individual dynamic workspaces – i.e. human
hypersociality in the context of an embedding epigenetic sys-
tem of cultural inheritance – would be even more adaptation-
ally efficient. Indeed, equations (30-32) suggest the possibility
of very strong linkage of individual consciousness and phys-
iology to embedding sociocultural network phenomena, ulti-
mately producing an extended model of consciousness which
does not fall victim to the mereological fallacy.
In just this regard Nisbett et al. (2001) review an extensive
literature on empirical studies of basic cognitive differences
between individuals raised in what they call ‘East Asian’ and
‘Western’ cultural heritages, which they characterize, respec-
tively, as ‘holistic’ and ‘analytic’. They find:
1. Social organization directs attention to some aspects of
the perceptual field at the expense of others.
2. What is attended to influences metaphysics.
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3. Metaphysics guides tacit epistemology, that is, beliefs
about the nature of the world and causality.
4. Epistemology dictates the development and application
of some cognitive processes at the expense of others.
5. Social organization can directly affect the plausibility of
metaphysical assumptions, such as whether causality should
be regarded as residing in the field vs. in the object.
6. Social organization and social practice can directly in-
fluence the development and use of cognitive processes such
as dialectical vs. logical ones.
Nisbett et al. (2001) conclude that tools of thought em-
body a culture’s intellectual history, that tools have theories
built into them, and that users accept these theories, albeit
unknowingly, when they use these tools.
Individual consciousness – currently defined in terms of
the dynamic global neuronal workspace – appears to be pro-
foundly affected by cultural, and perhaps developmental, con-
text, and, we aver, by patterns of embedding psychosocial
stress, all matters subject to a direct empirical study which
may lead to an extension of the concept particularly which
will clearly be useful in understanding certain forms of psy-
chopathology.
From even limited theoretical perspectives, current dy-
namic systems models of neural networks, or their computer
simulations, simply do not reflect the imperatives of Adams’
(2003) informational turn in philosophy. On the other hand,
dynamic systems models based on differential equations, or
their difference equation realizations on computers, have a
history of intense and continuous intellectual development go-
ing back to Isaac Newton. Hence very little new mathematics
needs to be done, and one can look up most required results in
the textbooks, which are quite sophisticated by now. By con-
trast, rigorous probability theory is perhaps a hundred years
old, its information theory subset has seen barely a half cen-
tury, and the tunable retina atlas/manifold formalism is still
under development. Consequently the mathematics can’t al-
ways be looked up, and must often be created de novo, with
considerable difficulty. One is reminded, not originally, of a
drunk looking for his lost car keys under a street lamp ‘be-
cause the light is better here’.
Nisbett’s caution that tools of thought embody a cultural
history whose built-in theories users implicitly adopt is no
small matter: dynamical systems theory carries with it more
than just a whiff of the 18th Century mechanical clock, while
statistical mechanics models of neural networks cannot pro-
vide natural linkage with the sociocultural contexts which
carry the all-important human epigenetic system of heritage.
Most current applications of information theory to the dy-
namic global neuronal workspace, however, appear to have
strayed far indeed from the draconian structural discipline
imposed by the asymptotic limit theorems of the subject. In-
formation measures are of relatively little interest in and of
themselves, serving primarily as grist for the mills of split-
ting criteria between high and low probability sets of dynamic
paths. This is the central mechanism whose extension, using
a homology with free energy density, permits exploration of
tunably punctuated dynamics in a manner consistent with the
program described by Adams (2003).
According to the mathematical ecologist E.C. Pielou (1976,
p.106), the legitimate purpose of mathematical models is to
raise questions for empirical study, not to answer them, or,
as one wag put it, “all models are wrong, but some models
are useful”. The natural emergence of tunable punctuated
dynamics in our treatment, albeit at the expense of elabo-
rate renormalization calculations at transition, and general-
ized Onsager relations away from it, suggests the possible util-
ity of the theory in future empirical studies of consciousness:
the car keys really may have been lost in the dark parking lot
down the street, but here is a new flashlight.
We have outlined an empirically-testable approach to mod-
eling consciousness which returns with a resounding thump
to the classic asymptotic limit theorems of communication
theory, and suggests further the necessity of incorporating
the effects of embedding structures of psychosocial stress and
culture. The theory suffers from a painful grandiosity, claim-
ing to incorporate matters of cognition, consciousness, so-
cial system, psychopathology, and culture into a single all-
encompassing model. To quote from a recent review of Ben-
nett and Hacker’s new book, (Patterson, 2003), however, con-
temporary neuroscience itself may suffer a more pernicious
and deadly form of that disorder for which our approach is,
in fact, the antidote:
“[Bennett and Hacker] argue that for some neuro-
scientists, the brain does all manner of things: it be-
lieves (Crick); interprets (Edelman); knows (Blake-
more); poses questions to itself (Young); makes de-
cisions (Damasio); contains symbols (Gregory) and
represents information (Marr). Implicit in these as-
sertions is a philosophical mistake, insofar as it un-
reasonably inflates the conception of the ‘brain’ by
assigning to it powers and activities that are nor-
mally reserved for sentient beings... these claims are
not false; rather they are devoid of sense.”
This is but one example of a swelling critical chorus which
will grow markedly in virulence and influence. Our develop-
ment, or some related version, leads toward explicit incorpo-
ration of the full ‘sentient being’ into observational studies of
consciousness. For humans, whose hypersociality is both glory
and bane, this particularly involves understanding the effects
of the embedding social and cultural system of epigenetic in-
heritance on immediate conscious experience – searching for
the torus and the sphere.
The bottom line would seem to be the urgent necessity of
extending the perspective of Nisbett et al. (2001) to brain
imaging and other empirical studies of consciousness, and ex-
panding the global neuronal workspace model accordingly, a
matter which our development here suggests is indeed possi-
ble, if not straightforward.
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11 Appendix: an example of coarse-
graining
We use a simplistic mathematical picture of an elementary
predator/prey ecosystem for illustration. Let X represent
the appropriately scaled number of predators, Y the scaled
number of prey, t the time, and ω a parameter defining the
interaction of predator and prey. The model assumes that
the system’s ‘keystone’ ecological process is direct interaction
between predator and prey, so that
dX/dt = ωY
dY/dt = −ωX
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Thus the predator populations grows proportionately to the
prey population, and the prey declines proportionately to the
predator population.
After differentiating the first and using the second equation,
we obtain the differential equation
d2X/dt2 + ω2X = 0
having the solution
X(t) = sin(ωt);Y (t) = cos(ωt).
with
X(t)2 + Y (t)2 = sin2(ωt) + cos2(ωt) ≡ 1.
Thus in the two dimensional ‘phase space’ defined by X(t)
and Y (t), the system traces out an endless, circular trajectory
in time, representing the out-of-phase sinusoidal oscillations
of the predator and prey populations.
Divide the X − Y ‘phase space’ into two components – the
simplest ‘coarse graining’ – calling the halfplane to the left of
the vertical Y -axis A and that to the right B. This system,
over units of the period 1/(2piω), traces out a stream of A’s
and B’s having a very precise ‘grammar’ and ‘syntax’, i.e.
ABABABAB...
Many other such ‘statements’ might be conceivable, e.g.
AAAAA..., BBBBB..., AAABAAAB..., ABAABAAAB...,
and so on, but, of the obviously infinite number of possi-
bilities, only one is actually observed, is ‘grammatical’, i.e.
ABABABAB....
More complex dynamical system models, incorporating dif-
fusional drift around deterministic solutions, or even very
elaborate systems of complicated stochastic differential equa-
tions, having various ‘domains of attraction’, i.e. different
sets of grammars, can be described by analogous ‘symbolic
dynamics’ (e.g. Beck and Schlogl, 1993, Ch. 3).
12 Figure Captions
Figure 1 Channel capacity-source uncertainty and energy
consumption of a system of interacting neural modules as a
function of the inverse probability of weak ties coupling the
modules, K = 1/P . H is taken as proportional to an error
function in K, and energy consumption as a linear function
in P , i.e. Inverse in K.
Figure 2 Source uncertainty per unit energy and disorder
Q = [−KdH/dK] per unit energy, according to the model
of Figure 1. We assume that, for ‘social’ systems, cognitive
energy efficiency is to be maximized, while the experience of
disorder is to be minimized, which are competing require-
ments. Clearly, two stable regimes are possible to this model:
consciouss, or unconscious/sleeping, depending on the relative
weighting of the optimization, which may, indeed, change ac-
cording to resource availability: when tired, one falls asleep.
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